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As Patrick Grady’s appreciation in this volume notes, throughout his career 
David Slater has balanced “a deep commitment to markets and the key role 
of the private sector with an equally deep commitment to social policies 
designed to create equality of opportunity and provide support for those who 
are disadvantaged”. In recent years, his work (e.g., Slater, 1995) has 
especially emphasized the sustainability and design of Canada’s retirement 
security system. As an appreciation of his work, this chapter therefore asks: 
 
·   What are the achievements of the retirement security system which his 
generation of policymakers built in Canada?  
·   What design elements are responsible for its successes? 
·   What problems are there for the future? 
 
                                                             
1I would like to thank Andrew  Sharpe  for  his  helpful  comments,  Lynn 
Lethbridge for her excellent work on this project and the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada for its ongoing financial support under Grant 410-2001-0747. 
All remaining errors are my responsibility. 
Although it may now be the case that Canadian economists take a social 
safety net for granted, David Slater’s generation had the opportunity to 
observe what a society without social security really looks like. At the time 
when David was taking undergraduate economics at Queen’s University, Paul 
Samuelson was writing the first version of his best-selling text, Economics, in 
which he welcomed the fact that within the United States   
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a more or less comprehensive social security system had been set up within the 
past decade ... which will provide more generously for the old age of the bulk of 
our people than individual savings and interest earnings ever were able to in the 
past. In fact, we shall see in our later discussion of social security that one of the 
crushing indictments of the capitalistic system has been the well-authenticated 
charge that the vast majority of citizens have been unable — even after a lifetime of 
effort — to provide adequately for their old age. (Samuelson, 1948, p. 76) 
 
At the time, of course, Canada lagged well behind the United States in 
social policy. In 1947 in Canada a means-tested old age pension was available 
for the destitute at $30 per month (equivalent to about $289 per month at 
2001 prices), but that was all.
1 Not until 1952 was it replaced by Old Age 
Security (OAS). OAS was a universal payment of $40 per month, worth 
about $274 per month at today’s prices. With income support at this level, 
the result was widespread and acute poverty among Canadians over 65. 
Canada had to wait until 1967 for the introduction of the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement and Canada Pension Plan
2 (for details, see Perry, 1989, pp. 701-
709). 
                                                             
1The  Old Age Pension Act of 1927 was legislated by the minority Liberal 
government of MacKenzie King, in order to obtain the support of the “Ginger Group” of 
United Farmer and Labour Members of Parliament (who later formed the nucleus of the 
CCF). 
2The minority Liberal government of Lester Pearson needed the support of the 
New Democratic Party (who succeeded the CCF) at this time. 
The next section begins by describing the long-run trend in poverty 
among senior citizens (those aged 65 and over) in Canada, while the following 
section discusses some of the problems of poverty measurement that are 
peculiar to the over 65 population. The third section looks at the Canadian 
Old Age Security s ystem in an international perspective. It examines the 
income changes of Canadian, American, Swedish and British households as 
they move into their retirement years, with particular emphasis on the income 
of poorer households. The final section concludes with some discussion of 
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In order to appreciate what the Canadian retirement security system has 
achieved in reducing poverty among senior citizens, historical context is 
essential. However, data on the recent past are much more easily available 
and easier to work with than data on the 1950s and 1960s. Since micro data 
which enable analysts to calculate the size of the poverty gap or to adjust 
money incomes to reflect the cost of living of families of different size only 
became available in the 1970s, data on earlier years are limited to that 
available in published tables. 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Canadian senior citizens were 
much more likely to be poor than the general population during the 1950s and 
1960s. Table 1 is taken from the work of Podoluk (1968). A consistent 
theme in Statistics Canada publications has been the use of the term “low 
income” rather than the more easily understandable term “poverty”, and 
Podoluk’s work was instrumental in persuading Statistics Canada to adopt the 
Low Income Cut Off (LICO) methodology for assessing its extent. In this 
methodology, to be “low income” is to have “very little” left over after 
expenditure on items of basic necessity (food, clothing and shelter). 
Consequently, the 1968 LICO classified a family as low income if more than 
70 per cent of pre-tax income would normally be spent on necessities. 
 Panel A of Table 1 presents the incidence of low income in 1961 among 
all Canadian families, those families with head aged 65 or over and 
unattached individuals. Among families whose head was aged 65 or more, the 
poverty rate was substantially greater (43.9 per cent) than among all Canadian 
families (25.3 per cent). Furthermore, the single elderly (mostly women) who 
survived their spouses were almost certain to be poor. The incidence of low 
income for unattached individuals 70 or more was an astonishing 72.5 per 
cent. As Panel B of Table 1 notes, older families were substantially 
overrepresented in the bottom ranges of the income distribution, with 36.2 
per cent of families headed by someone aged 65 or more having an   
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Table 1   
 
A 
Incidence of Low Income* – 1961   
  % 
All Canadian Families      25.3 
Families: Head ³ 65      43.9 
Unattached Individuals 
60 – 64     50.7 
65 – 69     64.1 
70+        72.5 
_________________________________ 
B 
Per cent of Families by Income Group – 1961 
(converted to 2001 dollars)** 
 
£6,200  6,201-12,399  12,400-18,600  Median  Average 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
All Families       3.3         7.9         10.8  30,154   32,954 
 
Head ³ 65       8.8       27.4         16.8  17,407   23,158 
   
 
Notes:  *Original “Low-Income” criterion: > 70 per cent income spent on food, clothing 
and shelter. 
** Original income ranges = < 1,000, 1000–1,999, 2,000–2,999. 
All items CPI (1992 base) 2001 = 115.9; 1961 = 18.7. 
Source: Podoluk (1968, pp. 188, 194, 247, 257). 
 
 
income less than $12,400 (in 2001 dollars), compared to 11.2 per cent of all 
Canadian families.
3 
                                                             
3Today, analysts would typically make an assumption about the econo-mies of 
scale involved in household consumption, calculate an equivalence scale and examine the 
incidence and depth of low equivalent income among individuals of different ages. Older 
data are, however, presented in terms of the incidence of low income among families with a 
head of a given age, and no correction for family size. To retain comparability, we follow the 
older conventions. Appendix Table A1 demonstrates that these measurement conventions 
make little difference.  
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Although Americans received Social Security benefits beginning in 1935, 
Canadians had to wait until 1967 for the introduction of the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plan (CPP/QPP) and the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). 
Over time Canada Pension Plan benefits have increased in importance as 
individuals have been able to retire with longer histories of covered working 
years. Hence, as the CPP/QPP system matured in the 1970s, poverty among 
senior citizens  fell dramatically. Table 2 examines poverty among all 
Canadians and among those in households headed by an individual aged more 
or less than 65 years. 
Although the most commonly used statistic on poverty is the poverty 
rate, since Sen (1976) many authors have recognized that the poverty rate, by 
itself, is a poor index.
4 Simply counting the number of poor, as a percentage 
of all people, ignores any consideration of the depth of their poverty. As 
Myles and Picot (2000) have noted, some social policies transfer income to 
groups (such as single parents) whose incomes are well below the poverty 
line. Because their incomes are so far below the poverty line, policy changes 
which affect these groups may have large impacts on their well-being, but not 
show up in the poverty rate statistics if few individuals are actually moved 
over the poverty line. 
On the other hand, an index such as the average poverty gap ratio, which 
looks only at the average percentage shortfall of income below the poverty 
line, has the defect that it ignores the issue of how many people are poor. 
This paper therefore uses the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty 
intensity, which combines consideration of the poverty rate, average poverty 
gap ratio and inequality among the poor.
5 This paper also takes the view that 
poverty in Canada should be assessed in terms  of  Canadian  social  norms, 
and therefore calculates the poverty rate and poverty gap for each individual 
with reference to a Canada-wide norm of living standards.
6 
                                                             
4For surveys of the literature see Foster (1984); Hagenaars (1991); or Zheng 
(1997). 
5The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty intensity can be calculated as I 
= (rate)*(gap)*(1+G(x)) where “rate” is the percentage of the population with incomes 
below the poverty line (sometimes called the head count ratio), “gap” is the average 
percentage gap between the incomes of the poor and the poverty line and G(x) is the Gini 
index of inequality of the poverty gap among all people. For further details on the SST index, 
and its trends over time in Canada, see Osberg and Xu (1999) or Myles and Picot (2000). 
For international comparisons, see Osberg and Xu (1997, 2000).     
6In the main body of the text, the poverty line norm adopted is one-half the median 
equivalent income of all Canadian individuals, since this concept of poverty has been widely  
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The top panel of Table 2 reports poverty intensity, the poverty rate and 
the average poverty gap ratio counting only income from labour market 
earnings and capital, before taxes and before government transfers. As one 
can note from the last three columns, there is really very little trend over time 
in the amount of income poverty among senior citizens in Canada before 
government taxes and transfers. For the entire quarter-century from 1973 to 
1997 the poverty rate (before taxes and transfers) for seniors is stuck in the 
region of 60 per cent and the average poverty gap is about 70 per cent.  
However, poverty outcomes among senior citizens  after taxes and 
transfers are an entirely different story. Ideally, one would have comparable 
micro data from the period before the introduction of CPP/QPP and GIS, in 
order to assess the impact of the introduction of these programs. In reality, 
the first micro-data is available in 1973, and therefore misses the introduction 
effect of CPP/QPP and GIS in 1967. However, it is clear that the maturing of 
the CPP/QPP system has had a huge impact. Overall, poverty intensity for 
seniors in 1973 was 13.6. Poverty intensity declined by roughly an order of 
magnitude — to 1.7 — in the 24 years leading up to 1997. The decline in the 
poverty rate after taxes and transfers from 28.4 per cent in 1973 to 5.4 per 
cent in 1997 is more dramatic than the decline in the average poverty gap 
ratio (from 26.2 per cent to 15.8 per cent) — but either trend represents very 
substantial progress, and combined they represent a huge and lasting 
improvement.  
To appreciate the progress in poverty reduction among senior citizens in 
Canada, one only has to contrast their outcomes with the rising intensity of 
poverty among younger households, particularly in the 1990s. Prior to 1989, 
adverse trends in the distribution of market income were reversed by the 
tax/transfer mechanism, so limiting the extent of poverty increases was a 
social achievement. However, there is no evidence among younger Canadians 
of the lasting decline in poverty observed among the elderly.  
In 1973, poverty intensity on a pre-tax, pre-transfer basis among the 
under 65 households was 15.6, increasing to 17.8 in 1989 (i.e., by about 14 
per cent). Since after-tax, after-transfer poverty intensity for the non-elderly 
                                                                                                                                        
used in the international literature and can therefore be compared to international data. A 
disadvantage of this approach is that it does not recognize the differences in the cost of living 
that accompany residence in urban and rural areas. Appendix Table A1 therefore presents 
the results obtained when the before-tax Statistics Canada Low Income Cut Off (LICO), 
which builds in city size and urban/rural cost of living differentials, is used as the poverty line. 
Unfortunately, the LICO methodology is unique to Canada and cannot be directly compared 
internationally.  
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actually declined until 1989 by about 17 per cent (from 7.8 to 6.5), it is clear 
that until the 1990s the operation of the Canadian tax/transfer system was 
quite successful in reversing a trend to greater poverty in market incomes. 
However, the 1990s were a different story. For those under 65, poverty 
intensity before taxes and transfers rose substantially from 17.8 in 1989 to 
23.1 in 1997 — an increase of about 30 per cent. From 1989 to 1997, 
poverty intensity in post-tax, post-transfer income among those under 65 rose 
from 6.5 to 8.6 — an increase of slightly greater magnitude (32 per cent). As 
a result, the gains of the 1973 to 1989 period were erased and reversed. 
 Looking at the 1973 to 1997 period as a whole, the poverty rate in 
market income rose from 16.8 to 21 per cent and the average poverty gap 
rose from 49.1 per cent to 59.2 per cent, so the increase in poverty intensity 
in market income was large — about 48 per cent (from 15.6 to 23.1). After 
taxes and transfers for the period as a whole between 1973 and 1997, the 
increase in poverty intensity (from 7.8 to 8.6) was much less, about 10 per 
cent. However, the achievements of the tax/transfer mechanism in offsetting 
trends in market income were largely a phenomenon of the period before 
1989, and it is useful to look separately at changes in the 1990s and before. 
To provide a more intuitive idea of the magnitude of poverty reduction 
among senior citizens and in the general population, Figures 1 and 2 present 
the “Poverty Box” for seniors and non-seniors in 1973 and 1997. These 
figures make use of a theoretical decomposition, combined with an empirical 
generalization.  
 Theoretically, poverty intensity can be calculated as: 
 
Poverty Intensity = (rate of poverty)*(average poverty gap)*(inequality of poverty) 
 
where “rate” is the percentage of the population with incomes below the 
poverty line, “gap” is the average percentage gap between the incomes of the 
poor and the poverty line and “inequality of poverty” is measured by one plus 
the Gini index of inequality of the poverty gap among all people. 
 
The empirical generalization is that the third term, measuring inequality of 
poverty gaps, is nearly constant. Empirically, it turns out that changes over 
time (or differences between countries or Canadian provinces) in the 
inequality of poverty gaps are very small, especially when compared to 
differences in the poverty rate and average poverty gap.
7 Since the inequality 
                                                             
7Across LIS countries the coefficient of variation of poverty rates is 0.493, and for 
average poverty gap ratios it is 0.185. However, the coefficient of variation of (1+G(x)) is 
only 0.014 (Osberg and Xu, 2000, p. 72). For Canadian provinces and U.S. states in 1997  
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of poverty gaps is nearly constant, the implication is that for practical 
purposes poverty intensity is proportional to the product of the poverty rate 
and the average poverty gap. Graphically, total poverty intensity can therefore 
be represented as the area of a Poverty Box — a rectangle whose base is the 
poverty rate and whose height is the average poverty gap ratio. 
Figures 1 and 2 present the Poverty Box for Canadians under 65, and 
aged 65 or more. Each figure compares poverty intensity before taxes and 
transfers (the dashed lines, labelled “pre-fisc”) to poverty intensity after taxes 
and transfers (solid lines, labelled “post-fisc”). Using these figures, one can 
easily see whether it is the impact of taxes and transfers on the poverty rate 
or the poverty gap that is driving over all poverty intensity trends. 
Since it is often useful to see how much of the total poverty of the nation 
is contributed by poverty in different groups, in both Figure 1 and Figure 2 
the double vertical line divides the total population into the proportion aged 65 
or more and the fraction under 65. Graphically, if one wants to look only at 
poverty among younger Canadians, one can simply cover up the right hand 
side of the figure to visualize the impact of government (through taxes and 
transfers) on the poverty rate (horizontal axis) and average poverty gap 
(vertical axis) of Canadians under 65 years of age. On the other hand, if one 
wants to look just at poverty among senior citizens, one should cover up the 
left hand side of Figure 1 or 2 to see the impact of government on the poverty 
rate
8 and average poverty gap of Canadians 65 years of age and over. 
The total amount of poverty in Canada is, of course, the sum of poverty 
among all Canadians, both senior citizens and those under 65. In Figures 1 
and 2, total poverty intensity is proportional to the sum of the area of both 
Poverty Boxes — the Poverty Box for seniors plus the Poverty Box for 
younger Canadians. By adding the two boxes outlined with dashed lines, and 
comparing them to the total area of the two boxes outlined in solid lines, one 
                                                                                                                                        
the CV is 0.341 for the SST index, 0.384 for the poverty rate, 0.141 for the poverty gap 
ratio and 0.011 for (1+G(X)), see also Osberg and Xu (1999). The “common sense” verbal 
explanation for the unimportance of inequality among the poor in an aggregate measure of 
poverty intensity is that the differences in income among the poor are small when compared 
to income differences among the non-poor. The upper bound on the incomes of poor people 
is the poverty line. The lower bound (leaving aside measurement error), is subsistence. The 
dollar value of the difference is not large, particularly when compared to the dollar differences 
among the non-poor population. See Osberg and Xu (2000, p. 57) and Xu and Osberg 
(2000) for geometric proof. 
8For each group, the poverty rate is expressed as a fraction of that group, for 
example, the poverty rate for seniors is a percentage of Canadians aged 65 or more.  
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can see how much total Canadian poverty is reduced by taxes and transfers 
— particularly for the those 65 and over. 
 Figure 1 illustrates how much stronger in 1973 the impact of taxes and 
transfers was on the poverty rate and the poverty gap among seniors than 
among non-seniors. Figure 2 presents the same poverty box analysis for 
1997, and illustrates the quite dramatic impact which taxes and transfers had 
on poverty among senior citizens in Canada over the last quarter century. If 
one goes a little further back in time and compares the outcomes of 1997 with 
those of 1961, it is even clearer that poverty reduction among senior citizens 








Paradoxically, the success of Canada’s retirement security system in putting a 
floor under the incomes of senior citizens has a flip side — an increased 
potential sensitivity of poverty measurement among seniors to “technical” 
measurement issues. Although there is little doubt as to the trend in poverty 
among senior citizens in Canada, assessment of the level of poverty in 
Canada is complicated a bit by the fact that many seniors now have much the 
same money income. Because analysts may draw the poverty line at slightly 
different income levels, small differences in the poverty line may imply large 
changes in the measured poverty rate. 
 Because they have retired from the labour force, often without private 
pensions or appreciable savings, in Canada (as in all the advanced countries) 
many of the elderly depend  entirely on social transfers.
9 Their income 
determination process is therefore totally unlike that of the non-elderly, who 
mix transfers and earned income and have wages and hours of work which 
vary with different jobs and fluctuate over the course of a year. Precisely 
because the elderly typically have no earnings and the retirement security 
                                                             
9Luxembourg Income Study data indicate that in 1994, among households 
composed of seniors the percentage whose only income was government transfers was 21.6 
per cent in Canada, 16.3 per cent in the United States, 22 per cent in Australia, 50.1 per cent 
in Germany, 52.9 per cent in Luxembourg, 18.2 per cent in France, and 14 per cent in the 
Netherlands.   
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system provides their income, many of them have much the same income 
because it is derived from the same source and calculated by the same benefit 
formula. 
When that basic income is close to the poverty line, small variations in 
either the poverty line or the level of basic seniors’ benefits has the potential 
to reclassify large numbers of people — either pushing them into, or out of, 
poverty. Up to this point, this paper has used the common practice, in the 
international literature, of drawing the poverty line at one-half the median 
equivalent after-tax/after-transfer income of individual Canadians (where 
household economies of scale are assumed to be captured by the LIS 
equivalence scale). This measurement choice implies a significantly lower 
poverty rate for Canada as a whole (11.57 per cent in 1994
10) than the use of 
the Statistics Canada Low Income Cut Off (15.9 per cent in 1994). (The 
reason is that a relative poverty line, like half the median, may decline with a 
decrease in general living standards such as that which occurred in Canada in 
the early 1990s; the LICO, on the other hand, remains fixed in real terms.) 
In the Appendix, Table A1 reports the poverty intensity, the poverty rate 
and poverty gap using as the poverty line the before-tax LICO of Statistics 
Canada. The debate on which poverty line is more appropriate clearly affects 
the perceived  level  of poverty for all groups, but for the non-elderly 
population there is little impact on trends. However, poverty among the 65 
and over population is potentially more sensitive to measurement choices. 
Because there is likely to be a “spike” in the income distribution of the 
elderly, which has the potential to affect poverty measurement, the empirical 
issue is whether different choices of the poverty line lie on opposite sides of 
that spike. Figures 3, 4 and 5 therefore use Luxembourg Income Study data 
to graph the income distribution of one- and two-person elderly and non-
elderly households in Canada, the United States and Australia in 1994. In 
                                                             
10The poverty line used in this paper is conceptually similar to the Low Income 
Measure (LIM) of Statistics Canada, which sets the over-all 1994 poverty rate at 14.7 per 
cent (see Statistics Canada, 1999, p. 17) compared to the 11.8 per cent poverty rate for all 
ages reported in Table 2. The difference arises because the LIM uses pre-tax, post-transfer 
income (while we use after-tax, after-transfer income), calculates the median across families 
(we take the median across individuals, assuming that income is pooled within households) 
and does not exclude people with negative incomes (we do). The fact that such “technical” 
statistical choices produce variation in the poverty line, and the implied poverty rate, is a 
pointer to the ambiguity and imprecision surrounding exact statements about the level of 
poverty. In most cases, statements about poverty trends are little affected, but the reason why 
the “spike” in the incomes of seniors matters is that small variations in the poverty line have 
the potential to reclassify large numbers of people.  
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each graph, the frequency distribution of incomes in the modal interval is 
presented, as well as the frequency of observations of incomes lying above 
and below the mode. Australia has a very significant spike in the income 
distribution of elderly persons, with 50.6 per cent of one-person households 
in the $2,000 modal interval. In Canada, 30.1 per cent of one-person elderly 
households are in the same interval, while in the United States the spike is 
much less pronounced, with only 16.3 per cent in the modal interval.
11  
These national differences are easily explained by the structure of the 
retirement security systems in the three countries. Australia has historically 
had a flat rate, means-tested pension; the spike in the income distribution is 
simply the maximum pension benefit (which applies when the individual has 
no other source of money income). The Canadian system combines a flat rate 
federal OAS payment with income supplementation through the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement, but the general availability of CPP benefits tied to earlier 
earnings builds in some differentiation among those persons with an earnings 
history. In the United States, there is no universal component, and  pension 
entitlement under Social Security replicates in old age more of the dispersion 
in incomes that occurred during the working years. 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 illustrate, therefore, how much the income distribution 
of the elderly depends on the details of design of public pensions for the 
elderly. In Australia and Canada there is a spike in the income distribution of 
the elderly which is rather close to commonly used definitions of the poverty 
line. In Canada, the income distribution spike is above both the after-tax 
LICO and half-median equivalent disposable income conceptions of the 
poverty line, implying that conclusions about poverty trends are robust to 
these particular choices of poverty line. However, since the income 
distribution spike is close to the poverty line, it is fair to say that many seniors 
are “near-poor”. As well, the more commonly used pre-tax Low Income Cut 
Off of Statistics Canada generates a significantly higher poverty rate than the 
after-tax LICO. Since Figures 3 to 5 are drawn in terms of after-tax income, it 
cannot be represented directly there, but it appears to lie very close to the 
income distribution spike. 
In both Australia and the United States, the elderly are a group for whom 
small changes in money income or equivalence scale or the poverty line are 
more important. Because the official U.S. poverty line is so low, it is well 
below the income distribution spike. However, if the poverty line is set at the 
                                                             
11For persons under 65, the percentage in the comparably defined modal interval of 
the income distribution was in 1994: Canada, 9.4 per cent; United States, 8 per cent; 
Australia, 11.3 per cent.  
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international criterion of one-half median equivalent disposable income, or at 
the real value of the after-tax Canadian LICO, the U.S. income distribution 
mode for the single elderly is just below the poverty line. Because, in these 
countries, many of the elderly have incomes that are quite close to reasonable 
specifications of the poverty line, small changes in the definition or 
measurement of that poverty line can appear to have large poverty 
consequences. 
The spike in the income distribution of the elderly is very pronounced in 
Australia, but not nearly as much in the United States. Canada (like most 
other countries) is an intermediate case. Hence, since comparisons over time 
or across countries are affected by this spike to differing degrees in different 
countries, for Canadian seniors the point to remember is the clustering of 
many people’s retirement income in a fairly narrow range, which is above, 
but not very far above, reasonable definitions of the poverty line. 
In thinking of the social context of income flows, of course, one must 
also consider the adequacy of the definition of “income” which is used as an 
indicator of economic well-being. Thus far, this paper has looked at income 
poverty and the concept of poverty used has been based on the calculation of 
equivalent family money income, which is based in turn on the Survey of 
Consumer Finance definition of measured family money income. This ignores 
the economic well-being entailed by the ownership of wealth, the receipt of 
in-kind income, the time cost of earning income and exposure to economic 
insecurity.  
In the comparison of birth cohorts of Canadians, a particularly important 
issue is the imputed rent and capital gains arising from home ownership. The 
cohort of Canadians who were fortunate enough to purchase their homes 
during the era of low real interest rates and low housing prices (i.e., pre-1975) 
benefited significantly from capital gains in the housing market of the late 
1970s and early 1980s. However, the stagnation of real housing prices since 
the early 1980s has meant that younger cohorts have not received comparable 
capital gains, meanwhile paying substantially higher real interest rates on their 
mortgage indebtedness. Although the realization of such capital gains is 
subject to significant transactions costs (in real estate fees and the loss of 
neighbourhood social ties) older cohorts who have retired their mortgage debt 
do benefit annually from a stream of housing services, which is not counted 
as part of money income. Since most of the members of younger cohorts are 
either paying rents or mortgage interest, inter-generational comparisons of 
money income may not accurately reflect well-being.  
As well, cohorts differ in the type and amount of public services that they 
receive. Since senior citizens are at a stage in life when they are very likely to 
need medical care, they benefited disproportionately from the general increase  
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in economic security that came with the introduction of universal medicare in 
1968–70 in Canada. In general, the perceived relative well-being of senior 
citizens i s particularly affected by the value assigned to the medical and 
hospital services they receive from the public sector. However, despite the 
fact that household money income omits consideration of the value of these 
services, it does not seem appropriate to add their cost to money income, 
since one would not want to argue that the sick have more income than the 
healthy, just because they receive more medical services.
12 Hence, this paper 
makes no adjustment to money income to account for the value of in-kind 
services received. 
The calculation of household money income also ignores the opportunity 
cost of the time supplied by households to the paid labour market in order to 
earn income. The retired population do not have these costs, but the 
population of working age do. Furthermore, the relative differential in costs 
has changed over time. Over the 1975 to 1994 period, married women 
substantially increased their labour force participation rates, implying that 
although working-age families have had more money income, they also have 
had less leisure, and less opportunity for home production. Comparison of the 
well-being of senior citizens and those under 65 is also affected by the 
increase in economic insecurity, which has been greatest among youth during 
the period 1975 to 1994 (see Osberg, Erksoy and Phipps, 1998). Retirees 
have graduated to a status that is no longer affected by the ups and downs of 
the labour market, but working-age Canadians still face labour market risk, 
although their exposure differs markedly. Those who entered the labour 
market during the 1960s and 1970s entered a labour market in which 
unemployment was relatively low and jobs with contractual guarantees of 
continued employment were relatively abundant. After 1971, the potential 
costs of  unemployment were cushioned by a relatively generous 
unemployment insurance system. In the 1990s, however, double digit 
unemployment rates were common, jobs with employment security became 
rarer and unemployment insurance was drastically cut in benefits, coverage 
and eligibility. Many older Canadians have worked their way up the seniority 
ladder into positions of relative job security, but younger Canadians were 
highly exposed. For much of the 1990s, the combination of higher 
unemployment, decreased private sector guarantees of job security and 
                                                             
12If one calculated the total income of Canadians as their money income plus the 
value of in-kind services received, a resident of the intensive care ward would appear to have 
an extremely high total income, which would be greatest for those with the longest stays. This 
way of calculating “total income” would be a very poor guide to their well-being.  
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decreased income protection from unemployment insurance produced a 
pervasive sense of economic insecurity in the Canadian labour force.
13 
In successive cross-sectional samples from the population, such as the 
SCF, one cannot observe either the ex post realized fluctuations of money 
income over time or any ex ante anxieties about possible future income 
fluctuations. Nevertheless, risk averse individuals are willing to pay an 
insurance premium for greater income certainty, and rising levels of income 
uncertainty can be expected to have a utility cost, which this paper does not 
attempt to measure. 
Important aspects of economic well-being which are unmeasured in this 
paper’s calculation of poverty trends include implicit income from home 
ownership and public services, plus the greater relative benefit from freedom 
from the increasing time pressures and the greater economic insecurity that 
affect working-age Canadians. Although these are important issues, in a very 
real sense their omission from this paper only serves to strengthen the general 
message that the relative well-being of Canadian seniors has, on average, 
improved markedly over the last 30 years. 
If the issue is trends in deprivation, however, averages can also be highly 
misleading, and particularly so when age cohorts are compared. In his article 
in this volume, Malcolm Hamilton compares average incomes of retirees and 
those of working age. He also notes that using the concept of “income” as an 
indicator of well-being excludes from consideration the utility derived from 
consumption which is enabled by depletion of capital. Since the elderly have, 
on average, substantial assets, they could on average consume from the 
disposition of those assets. However, the problem with that mode of analysis 
is that it ignores the inequality in incomes and the high and rising level of 
inequality in wealth ownership. 
In general, there is more inequality in the wealth distribution than in the 
distribution of annual income; and the rich and poor differ in the type of 
assets they own, as well as in the amount of assets. In 1999, as in previous 
years, the basic picture was “30-60-10”. The poorest 30 per cent of the 
population have essentially no assets (except perhaps automobiles, which are 
the most equally distributed type of asset) and that changes little over their 
lifetimes. For the 60 per cent who are “middle class”, the key asset is the 
family home — as families gradually pay off the mortgage, their net worth 
                                                             
13Graves (2001) notes that in the late 1990s lower unemployment produced a 
substantial decline in survey measures of economic insecurity. The importance of macro-
economic policy for such social outcomes is a lesson that I first learned in David Slater’s 
course on Money and Banking at Queen’s University in 1965–66.  
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increases and they gradually work their way up the distribution of wealth. As 
they age, they also acquire more consumer durables, and often some financial 
assets such as RRSPs.  
However, although there has been some increase in the percentage of the 
population who own financial assets such as stocks, bonds and mutual funds, 
only a few people have major money. Most financial assets are owned by the 
top 10 per cent of households, who in total owned 55.7 per cent of total net 
worth in 1999, up significantly from 51.8 per cent in 1984 (Morissette, Zhang 
and Drolet, 2001).  
The “bottom line” is that fungible wealth is very narrowly held in 
Canada. A substantial fraction of the population make the transition into 
retirement with essentially no marketable assets, while the main possession of 
the broad middle class is the family home, which is indivisible and illiquid. 
Hence, when it concerns those at risk of deprivation in old age — that is, the 
lower half of the income distribution — money income retains its importance. 
 
 
The Transition to Retirement 
 
 
What happens to people’s incomes, particularly those at risk of poverty, as 
they age into retirement?  
Since income and wealth in later life reflect the cumulative influence of 
many factors which can be strongly and mutually self-reinforcing (e.g., life 
events such as divorce or ill health, professional success or failure, ability to 
acquire and retain home ownership, etc.), trends in average incomes can be 
very misleading as a guide to trends in deprivation. As already noted, the 
details of the design of retirement security systems can have a major impact 
on the income distribution of seniors, and since countries differ significantly in 
the design of their retirement security systems, it is useful to examine 
comparative international evidence.  
This section of the paper uses Luxembourg Income Study micro data to 
follow the fortunes of the birth cohort which moved into retirement as they 
aged from approximately 1979–81 to 1994–95. The data present point 
estimates
14 of income distribution trends over time for Canada (1981 and 
1994), Sweden (1981 and 1995), United Kingdom (1979 and 1995), and the 
                                                             
14Although estimates of the confidence intervals surrounding these point estimates 
are not presented here, interested readers can find such estimates (for the population as a 
whole), as calculated using a bootstrap methodology, in Osberg and Xu (1997).   
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United States (1979 and 1994). Although the exact dates of the data for 
individual countries are determined by the availability of comparable micro 
data in LIS, the essential thing we want to make use of is the fact that the 
cohort born between 1915 and 1929 moved from pre-retirement to retirement 
over this period — someone born into this group was 51 to 65 in 1980 and 65 
to 79 in 1994.  
 The focus is on the distribution of equivalent income among individuals, 
but the statistical starting point is the LIS definition of total household money 
income after tax (disposable income)
15 as the basis for calculation of the 
“equivalent income” of all individuals within households. We examine all 
national residents, as listed by LIS, excluding only those economic families or 
unattached individuals who reported a zero or negative before-tax money 
income. 
 Of course, comparing the experience of birth cohorts across different 
years in LIS data is not a substitute for actual panel data. The sample of 
people born 1915 to 1929 who responded to the Canadian Survey of 
Consumer Finance in 1981 are not, for example, the same people as the 
respondents in the survey of 1994 who were born in the same period. 
However, both samples are drawn from the same population of individuals 
(subject to the attrition of mortality and the impact of net migration), and both 
samples can be used to estimate characteristics of the distribution of income 
of that population. In the discussion that follows, the income of deciles of the 
income distribution will be compared over time. To the extent that individuals 
change their rank in the income distribution, these deciles of the income 
distribution will consist of different persons, but if one wants to assess trends 
in inequality, the issue is whether income mobility within cohorts has 
increased or decreased over time.
16 
                                                             
15Disposable income consists of the sum of gross wages and salaries, farm self-
employment income, non-farm self-employment income, cash property income, sick pay, 
disability pay, social retirement benefits, child or family allowances, unemployment 
compensation, maternity pay, military/veteran/war benefits, other social insurance, means-
tested cash benefits, near-cash benefits, private pensions, public sector pensions, alimony or 
child support, other regular private income, and other cash benefits; minus mandatory 
contributions for self-employed, mandatory employee contribution and income tax. 
16In the United States, Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt conclude that: “the rate of 
mobility appears to have declined since the late 1960s” (1999, p. 89). Dickens’ conclusion 
for the United Kingdom is similar: “earnings mobility has fallen since the late 1970s” (1999, 
p. 223). On the other hand, Baker and Solon (1998) use income tax data to conclude that 
the year-to-year instability of income in Canada has risen over the period 1975 to 1993. 
Since trends in the average income of income deciles represent shifts in the pattern of ultimate  
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Over the period 1980 to 1995, the cohort born between 1915 and 1929 
aged from being 51 to 66 to being 66 to 81. Although most households in this 
age bracket had a member in the paid labour force in 1980, almost all had 
retired by 1995. As earnings were replaced by pensions, the money incomes 
of most deciles of the income distribution in all countries fell. However, the 
structure of the income support system for the elderly matters a great deal. In 
some countries (especially Canada) the presence of a floor to old age security 
benefits which is higher than social assistance for the non-elderly has meant 
that the poorest decile are actually better off in their retirement years than in 
their working years.  
Countries differ in the extent to which the old age security system 
emphasizes earnings-related pensions over flat rate, needs-based benefits. In 
the United States, there are broadly similar declines in the income of all but 
the poorest and richest deciles, as the Social Security system replicates for the 
pensions of the retired much of the inequality in earnings that they 
experienced as workers. This tendency is less marked in other countries. In 
both Canada and the United Kingdom the bottom quintile was better off in 
retirement than during their working years. Despite much media comment in 
the United States on the affluence of the elderly, it is notable that the decline 
in income of the cohort moving into retirement is significantly larger in the 
United States than it is for most other countries. 
Figures 6 and 7 present the income distribution of the pre-retirement and 
retirement cohorts. In these figures, the average equivalent income (after-tax, 
after-transfer) of each decile of individuals in the income distribution is 
expressed relative to the poverty line for a single person. Figure 6 uses the 
relative concept that the poverty line is one-half the median equivalent income 
of all persons, while Figure 7 adopts the absolute poverty line methodology of 
the U.S. Social Security Administration (converted to national currencies 
using the OECD purchasing power parity calculations). 
In terms of absolute poverty, the Canadian and Swedish systems clearly 
do much more for the worst off than the U.S. or U.K. systems. Just prior to 
retirement, in Canada the bottom tenth have incomes that are on average 73 
per cent of the U.S. official poverty line in real terms, while in Sweden the 
                                                                                                                                        
economic rewards across individuals given the degree of individual mobility from year to 
year, and since there is some evidence of decreased mobility in the two countries 
 
 
that have demonstrated the greatest increase in income inequality, these trends in inequality of 
outcomes may understate tendencies to greater inequality of opportunity.  
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bottom decile have incomes that average 79 per cent of the U.S. poverty line. 
After  retirement,  the  bottom  10  per  cent  of  Swedes  and  Canadians  are 
actually better off than in their pre-retirement years — Swedes are closer to 
the U.S. poverty line (at 89 per cent ) while the bottom decile of Canadians 
are 12 per cent above the line. By contrast, in the United Kingdom the 
poorest tenth of the pre-retirement cohort are only marginally better off in 
their retirement years (moving from 74 per cent of the U.S. poverty line to 
77.5 per cent). In the United States, the poorest decile are worse off when 
they retire. The bottom tenth of American 50 to 64 year olds had incomes in 
1979 that were, on average, only 71 per cent of the U.S. official poverty line 
while in 1994, the poorest tenth of the retirement cohort of 65 to 79 year olds 
had even lower incomes, averaging only 68 per cent of the poverty line. 
 It is notable that although the United States is the richest nation in over-
all average income terms, the bottom decile of seniors are absolutely worse 
off in the United States than in any other country examined, and by a large 
margin, especially compared to Canada (expressing it in terms of the U.S. 
official Social Security poverty line, the difference between being at 112 per 
cent for worst-off seniors in Canada and being at 68 per cent in the United 
States is equal to about 44 per cent of the poverty line). 
Canadian success in reducing the poverty of seniors is much the same if 
one uses a relative poverty line. Since drawing a poverty line at one-half the 
median equivalent income implies a higher poverty line in all countries than 
the real value of the U.S. official poverty line, and since that relative poverty 
line has changed over time (unlike the fixed absolute level of the SSA poverty 
line), Figure 6 is not quite the same as Figure 7, but the conclusion is similar. 
 Measuring poverty in relative terms, Canada clearly does the best job in 
pulling retirees up to the poverty line, since the bottom decile of 52–66 year 
olds in 1981 had incomes that averaged only 66 per cent of the poverty line, 
while the bottom tenth of 65 to 79 year olds in 1994 were at 96 per cent of 
the relative poverty line. In the other three countries, the bottom decile of the 
1915 to 1929 cohort stayed in much the same place in relative poverty terms 
— marginally above the relative poverty line in Sweden (moving from 104 
per cent to 107 per cent), somewhat below in the United Kingdom (84 per 
cent in 1979 compared to 83 per cent in 1995) and well below in the United 
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Conclusion and Implications 
 
 
Canada has done a remarkable job in ensuring that senior citizens receive, in 
their retirement years, an income sufficient to prevent poverty. In comparison 
with outcomes in the past, or with those in other countries today, Canada’s 
retirement security system has been relatively successful in protecting the 
elderly from deprivation. The contrast with the United States is particularly 
striking. Although the poorest Canadian seniors were much worse off than 
American seniors 40 years ago, they are now much better off. 
Canadian transfer programs for those 65 and over have combined a 
universal demogrant (Old Age Security), a Negative Income Tax (the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement) and an earnings-related pension (CPP/ 
QPP). The demogrant and NIT components serve to establish an income 
floor that is available to all, regardless of whether they have been in the paid 
labour force or not during their earlier years. Historically this feature has been 
especially important for women who have spent many years working in the 
home, without acquiring entitlements to an earnings-related pension in their 
own name. As time passes and the cohort of women who have been in the 
paid workforce more continuously ages into retirement, this feature can be 
expected to decrease in relative importance, but it will always be a necessary 
backstop for those with significant interruptions in their earnings histories. 
The CPP/QPP system has the enormous advantages of complete 
coverage of the workforce, portability, low administration costs and 
indexation. However, it is not designed as a full income replacement scheme. 
In 1999, maximum benefits were $ 9,020 per year, for retirees aged 65 (with 
the possibility of enhancement or reduction for early or late retirement over 
the age range 60 to 70). Since benefits are designed to be a maximum of 
about 25 per cent of the average industrial wage, it is clear that the focus of 
the plan is preventing deprivation in old age, and it is equally clear from the 
data that the retirement security system has had major success in reaching 
that objective. The maintenance, for the population as a whole, of working-
age consumption patterns during the retirement years is a different issue — 
one that Canadian policy leaves more to the savings decisions of individuals 
(albeit assisted by the tax treatment of RRSPs and Registered Pension Plans).  
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By contrast, the U.S. Social Security system replicates in old age much 
more of the inequality in earnings observed during the working years. The 
U.S. system aims at providing coverage for a significantly higher fraction of 
earnings, and in that sense is more clearly oriented to benefit a “middle class” 
constituency. Although the benefit formula is relatively advantageous to low-
wage workers, they still, in the end, only receive a percentage of a low num-
ber as their retirement income. Samuelson’s remark that “one of the crushing 
indictments of the capitalistic system has been the well-authenticated charge 
that the vast majority of citizens have been unable — even after a lifetime of 
effort — to provide adequately for their old age” is no longer true for the 
majority, but it remains true for a significant minority. 
As Canada enters the twenty-first century and a higher fraction of the 
Canadian population ages into retirement, the policymakers of David Slater’s 
generation have much to be proud of in Canada’s retirement security system. 
The challenge for current policymakers will be how best to build upon the  
major success story of Canadian social policy in the twentieth century — the 
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Appendix Table A1: Poverty Intensity and Components Using the Before-Tax LICO as Poverty Line 





Those < 65 Years Old 
 
































































































































































Notes: The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty intensity is calculated as  I = (rate)*(gap)*(1+G(x)) where “rate” is the percentage of the 
population with incomes below the poverty line (sometimes called the head count ratio), “gap” is the average percentage gap between the incomes of 
the poor and the poverty line and G(x) is the Gini index of inequality of the poverty gap among all people. Since the term (1+G(x)) is nearly constant, 
it is not presented explicitly. 
In 1997, the actual number of people aged 65 years or more is available. In 1973, households are classified by the age of the household head. 
* Maintains comparability with 1973. 
** Weighted using the (actual number aged 65 years or more ** sample weight) for seniors and (actual number < 65 years ** sample weight) for 
those under 65. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Survey of Consumer Finance, Economic Families.  
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Head of Family < 65 
 















































































































































































































































Notes: The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index of poverty intensity is calculated as I = (rate)*(gap)*(1+G(x)) where “rate” is the percentage of the 
population with incomes below the poverty line (sometimes called the head count ratio), “gap” is the average percentage gap between the incomes of 
the poor and the poverty line and G(x) is the Gini index of inequality of the poverty gap among all people. Since the term (1+G(x)) is nearly constant, 
it is not presented explicitly. 
The poverty line used is one-half the median equivalent income where the equivalence scale is the square root of the total number of people in the 
family. 
Source: Author’s calculations using the Survey of Consumer Finance, Economic Families.  
Figure 1
Poverty Box - Prefisc and Postfisc



































                                                        89.8% = the percentage of individuals in families headed by someone < 65 years old.
note: The poverty line is 1/2 the median income (pre-fisc and post-fisc) for the entire country. The equivalence scale is the square root 













Poverty Box - Prefisc and Postfisc



































     postfisc
prefisc
postfisc
                                                 86.6% = the percentage of individuals in families headed by someone < 65 years old.
note: The poverty line is 1/2 the median income (pre-fisc and post-fisc) for the entire country. The equivalence scale is the square root of the total 
numbers of persons in the family.
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After Tax Income Distribution - $1000 Intervals 










































































After Tax Income Distribution - $1000 Intervals 










































































The LICOs are converted to US dollars using purchasing power parities (.79).Figure 5
After Tax Income Distribution - $1000 Intervals 


























































The LICOs are converted to Australian dollars using purchasing power parities (1.044). 
 
FIGURE 6









*note: The poverty line used is 1/2 the median equivalent after-tax income for each
country. The equivalence scale used is the square root of the total number in the household.













o ages 52-66 in 1981














ages 50-64 in 1979














ages 50-64 in 1979















o ages 52-66 in 1981
ages 66-80 in 1995 
  FIGURE 7









*note: The poverty line is the Social Security Administration (US Official line - before tax) 
for a one person household.
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ages 52-66 in 1981
ages 66-80 in 1995